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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
Student Rights Under the Due Process Clause...
Suspensions from Public Schools
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975)
N ADDRESSING ITSELF to the constitutionality of Section 3316.66 of the
Ohio Revised Code,' the United States Supreme Court in Goss v.
Lopez2 has ruled for the first time upon the extent to which the rights of
students are to be protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in conjunction with any disciplinary removal from a public
school.3 By its action the Court has tacitly undertaken to lift the cloud on
student rights which has existed under the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis,4 and interpose procedural safeguards upon any decision of
school officials to deprive a student of educational benefits. 5
During the early months of 1971, Betty Crome attended a demonstra-
tion at a neighboring school and was subjected to mass arrest with other
students and later released without being formally charged. Before her
own school was to begin on the following morning, she was notified of
her suspension for a 10-day period. Dwight Lopez was also suspended for
10 days without a hearing following a disturbance in his high-school
lunchroom. He later testified that he was an innocent bystander to the
disturbance. 6 Dwight Lopez, Betty Crome and seven other secondary
school students, each of whom had been suspended from schools in the
Columbus, Ohio, Public School System due to various incidents arising
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972), provides in pertinent part:
[T]he principal of a public school may suspend a pupil from school for not
more than ten days.... Such ... principal shall within twenty-four hours after
the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child,
and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or
suspension including the reasons therefor....
As the terms are utilized here, "suspension" refers to a dismissal from a school for
a short duration, generally 10 days or less; "expulsion" refers to a dismissal from a
public school for the remainder of a school term or longer.
295 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
3The Goss court approached the issue as to whether a state-created right to an
education is either a protected property or liberty interest under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.
4 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 described this common law doctrine thusly:
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of
restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer for the purposes for
which he is employed.
5 In the absence of sufficient state involvement, private or parochial secondary schools
are not amenable to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the
purposes of preventing arbitrary suspensions or expulsions. See Bright v. Isenbarger,
314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
6 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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during a period of student unrest, instituted a class action suit under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 7 against their respective school administrators.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that
Section 3316.66 of the Ohio Revised Code was unconstitutional in
that it permitted public school officials to deprive them of their rights
to an education without a hearing in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
A three-judge United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio declared that plaintiffs were denied procedural due process in
being suspended without a hearing either prior to suspension or within a
reasonable time thereafter, and that Section 3316.66 of the Ohio Revised
Code as it related to permitting such suspensions was unconstitutional. 8
The requested injunction, ordering the school administrators to expunge
all references to such suspensions from the students' records, was granted.
On direct appeal,9 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the district court. Writing for a majority of five,10 Justice
White held that students facing a temporary suspension from a public
school have a "property interest in educational benefits" and a "liberty
interest in reputation" which require protection under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment from arbitrary deprivations." The
opinion added that as a constitutionally protected minimum, due process
requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the
student be given notice of the accusation, an explanation of the evidence,
and an opportunity to proffer a vindication. 2
In historical context, the public school students' struggle for
recognition of constitutional rights has been long and arduous.1 As a
matter of tradition the courts have been renitent to interfere with the
policies and practices of the educational community.14 Although
the Supreme Court has infrequently reached constitutional rights issues
7 Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[1970]). The expansion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
helped to facilitate the presentation of student rights suits in federal due process
proceedings.
8 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss v.
Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
9Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (1966), direct appeals to the Supreme Court are
provided from decisions of three-judge district courts granting or denying an interlocu-
tory or permanent injunction in any civil proceeding.
10 Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall joined in the White opinion.
21 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 737 (1975).
SId. at 740.
I See generally J. HOoAN, Tm ScHooLs, THE CouRTs, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1974), for an historical overview.
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in the educational sphere, 15 the state and its school boards have been
acknowledged to have broad express or implied powers to adopt policies
and regulations relating to student conduct.16 The reasoning under the
due process test has been that the courts will not strike down any policy
established by a state or its school boards which is reasonably calculated
to effect and promote discipline within the school.'
7
Prior to 1954 and Brown v. Board of Education,8 public education
was almost exclusively considered to be a matter of state and local concern
and a body of case law developed at the state level that permitted, if not
actually sanctioned, educational policies and practices that failed to meet
federal constitutional requirements.' 9 Traditionally, a court would view a
particular school regulation to assure itself that reasonableness prevailed
as a factor in the making of school law.20 A state or school board's
treatment of its pupils carried a presumption of validity with the burden of
proof on the complainant to establish the unreasonableness of the regulation
or policy."' The concept has evolved, however, that when a constitutional
right is invoked, the burden is upon the state to justify the reasonableness
of educational regulations or policies that infringe upon that right.2"
Since 1954 the courts have embarked upon a minimal supervision of
public education. There has been a gradual infusion of constitutional
standards into educational policies, practices and structures. Under
traditional constitutional criteria in line with the due process test, the
attack on a state sanctioned educational policy or regulation has
generally involved two questions: 23
15 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (cases generally recognizing a liberty right under the first and
fourteenth amendments of a freedom to teach and a freedom to learn).
16 In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (in which the
Court recognized a student's protected right of symbolic expression under the first
and fourteenth amendments) the Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."
17 Compare Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966) with Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court balanced
a school regulation that prohibited the wearing of "freedom buttons" ("One man one
vote SNCC") against the interference with the students' protected right of free
expression on the basis of whether or not the buttons occasioned disruptive conduct.
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19J. HooAN, Ta SCHOOLS, Ta CoUaTs, AND TIM PUBLIC INTEREST 5, 79 (1974); see.
e.g., Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915).
2D See Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 251, 252, 250 S.W. 538, 539 (1923), which
upheld a school regulation which prohibited the wearing of talcum powder on the
faces of female students.
21 Id. at 254,250 S.W. at 539.
22 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23 Id. at 509.
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(1) whether the student has been unnecessarily denied a constitu-
tionally protected right, and
(2) whether the policy or regulation is reasonable, and not arbitrary,
as being pertinent to the operation and welfare of the
educational process.
Therefore, it is deemed permissible to enforce appropriate standards of
behavior provided that they are consistent with constitutional safeguards.
Until its decision in Goss, the Supreme Court only acknowledged
first amendment rights to exist in the public schools, as incorporated by
the force of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The Supreme Court was hesitant
to rely solely on the due process clause since any reasonable basis for a
state sanctioned policy or regulation would defeat the application of the
due process test. This hesitancy on the part of the Court was best expressed
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,Z wherein Jehovah's
Witnesses challenged the constitutionality of a school board regulation that
made a refusal to salute the flag grounds for expulsion from school. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Jackson stated:
[I]t is important to distinguish between the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is
applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with
the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the
principles of the First is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the
due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of
the First become its standard.26
Although the force of specific constitutional provisions strengthens
the applicability of the due process clause, in a proper case the Supreme
Court will recognize property or liberty interests to be protected by
the due process clause alone.
Prior to Goss, only inferences could be drawn as to how the
Supreme Court might rule upon the extent of due process rights to be
accorded public school students.2 7 With Dixon v. Alabama State Board
24E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (symbolic expression
is protected as long as normal school functions are not disrupted); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (the states' right to prescribe public school
curriculum does not "carry with it the right to prohibit on pain of criminal penalty,
the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon
reasons that violate the First Amendment"); West Virginia v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (a state cannot compel a student to pledge and salute the flag as a condition
for access to public education where such compulsion would interfere with the
student's intellectual or spiritual beliefs).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28 Id. at 639.
27 See generally Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 378 (1969); Buss, Procedural Due Process or School Discipline: Probing
the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545 (1971); H. C. Hudgins, Jr., The
Spring, 19751 RECENT CASES 573
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of Education,28 In re Gault,29 and Kent v. United States30 as a backdrop,
increased emphasis was placed in the federal courts on the expansion of
the judicial concern with individual rights to secondary school disciplinary
cases by the means of the due process clause. In Goss, the due process
rights of students expelled were not questioned.31 The distinction between
a suspension and an expulsion was recognized.32 The Court attested that
Dixon had been uniformly followed by the federal courts in making the
due process clause applicable -to decisions to remove a student from
the public school for a period of time long enough to classify the removal
as an expulsion.33 However, it appears to be due to conflicting decisions
of the lower federal courts, regarding the extent to which due process rights
were to be accorded suspended public school students, that the Supreme
Court made its delineation of applicable due process guarantees.
3 4
It was recently held in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriquez-5 that while education is important, it is not a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the federal constitution.
Wielding this principle as a basis for their argument, the appellants in
Goss contended that the due process clause did not attach to protect
against suspensions from the public school system. The Court made use
of a two-part analysis suggested in Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth3 6 in its approach to this issue: first, it determined whether the
interests at stake were within the fourteenth amendment's protection of
Discipline of Secondary School Students and Procedural Due Process: A Standard,
7 WAKE FoR.ss'r L. REv. 32 (1970); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary
Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 358 (1971).
28294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (wherein the due
process clause was held applicable to decisions made by a tax supported college to
remove a student from the institution for a period of time long enough for the removal
to be classified as an expulsion).
29 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). The Court described the due process to be accorded juvenile
offenders with the statement that "whatever may be their precise impact neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."
30 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (wherein the Court stated, "the admonition to function in
a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness").
31 While Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3316.66 (Page 1972) provides in pertinent part in
the case of an expulsion that, "[tihe pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of
a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board and shall be permitted to be
heard against the expulsion..." no similar procedure is provided for a suspended
student.32 Goss v. Lope; 95 S. Ct. 729, 737, 738 & n.8 (1975).
33 E.g., De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1972); Fielder v. Board
of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Neb. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Public
Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
34 As to the divergent holdings of the federal district courts compare Mills v. Board
of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) with Hernandez v. School District
Number One, 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970).
35411 U.S. 1 (1973).
36 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
[Vol. 8:3
5
Soden: Student Rights Under Due Process Clause
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
RcrENT CAsEs
liberty or property and then it determined whether the nature of the interests
were sufficient to cause procedural due process requirements to apply.
The Court in Roth had stated that property interests protected within
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause "are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules... that stem from an independent source such as state
law .... -37 Drawing upon the Roth definition, the Court in Goss recog-
nized educational benefits to be a protected property interest where the
state elects to "extend the right to an education" to its citizens by statute.3
Under this criterion, a citizen's entitlement to an education is to be
protected by the due process clause. On the basis of Ohio Revised Code
Sections 3313.4839 and 3313.64,40 directing local authorities to provide a
free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age, and Ohio
Revised Code Section 3321.04,4 a compulsory attendance law, the Court
established that the appellees were legitimately entitled to a public
education. Under the Court's analysis, a right once created is not to be
arbitrarily denied simply due to a charge of misconduct, as a procedural
process must come into operation to substantiate the charge."
The Court based its decision not only upon a protected property
interest, but also found a protected liberty interest in the appellees'
reputations. Due to the damaging effect which sustained and recorded
charges of misconduct can have upon a student's standing in his or
her educational community and on later opportunities for higher education
and employment, the Court held, under the authority of Wisconsin
v. Constantineau," that the appellees had a liberty interest in their
reputations which must be protected under the due process clause."
The appellants presented the argument, adopted by the dissenting
37 Id. at 577.
38 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735, 736 (1975).
39 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Page Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
"The board of education of each city, exempted village, local, and joint vocational
school district shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within
the district under its jurisdiction...."40 Omo REv. CODE AiN. § 3313.64 (Page Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
The schools of each city, exempted village, or local school district shall be free
to all school residents between five and twenty-one years of age.... School
residents shall be all youth who are children or wards of actual residents of the
school district. District of school residence shall be the school district in which
a school resident is entitled to attend school free. ...
41 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Page 1972) provides in pertinent part: "Every
parent, guardian, or other person having charge of any child of compulsory school
age ... must send such child to a school, which conforms to the minimum standards
prescribed by the state board of education, for the full time the school attended is in
session.... Excuses ... may be granted...."
42 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975).
43400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) wherein the Court stated: "Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
44 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Spring, 19751
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opinion, that a state created entitlement to education is not protected by
the due process clause unless the state subjects the student to a "severe
detriment or grievous loss" of that entitlement.45 Suspensions from school,
it was argued, do not assume constitutional dimensions.46 Applying the
Roth test to determine whether due process requirements attached,
the Court in Goss looked to the nature of the property interest in
educational benefits, rather than the weight that interest had when
balanced against the interests of the school system. 47 Stressing the
importance of the educational process, the Court concluded that a
suspension for "more than a trivial period," clearly indicating even
a one-day suspension," has a serious impact upon a child and that certain
minimal requirements of due process must be accorded to the student.49
In determining the nature of the minimum due process applicable to
students facing suspension, the Court stated that "some kind of notice"
and "some kind of hearing" is mandated. 5° The concern of the Court
appears to be to prevent unfair or erroneous exclusions from the
educational process and consequential interference with a student's pro-
tected interests. As a general rule notice and a hearing are required prior
to suspension. However, the Court's ruling allows immediate removal of a
student from school where his or her presence endangers persons or
property or threatens disruption of the academic process, with notice and
a hearing to follow as soon as is practicable.5 1 Although not deciding nor
construing the due process clause to require the school to afford the
student an opportunity to secure counsel or to call and confront witnesses,
the Court acknowledged by way of dicta that in longer suspensions,
expulsions, or unusual situations, something more than the rudimentary
procedures that the Court has detailed may be necessary.
5 2
Justice Powell, writing for the minority,53 dissented on the basis that
although Ohio Revised Code Sections 3313.48, 3313.64, and 3321.04
create the educational entitlement, under the Roth rationale Ohio Revised
Code Section 3316.66 "defines" the "dimensions" of the property
interest.54 The contention was that the Ohio legislature, having created
a property right amenable to the due process clause, may also protect or
45 As authority for the "grievous loss" standard, the case of Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) is
cited.
46 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 742 (1975).
47 Id. at 737.
48 Id. at 742 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).




53 Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, joined in the Powell
dissent.
5 4 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729,742 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:3
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limit the operation of that right when it is encompassed within an "entire
package of statutory provisions."5 5 Protesting that the majority ignored
precedent in reaching its decision, the dissenting opinion cited Tinker
v. Des Moines School District56 and Epperson v. Arkansas57 for the view
that the states have traditionally broad based powers concerning the
operation of their schools which are not incompatible with the individual
interests of the student.58 The dissenting opinion further protested the
majority's intrusion of the due process clause into "routine classroom
decisions." 59 Classifying a suspension as an inconsequential infringement
upon a student's interest in education, the minority expressed concern
that the Court had entered into a "thicket" of judicial intervention
into the operation of the educational process which would adversely
affect the quality of education.
60
Despite the concern expressed by the minority in Goss, and although
the Supreme Court there expanded the scope within which procedural
due process is to be accorded to public school students, the Court has not
abandoned its traditional due process approach to state sanctioned
educational policies and regulations. 61 Presumably on a case by case basis
any reasonable legislation affecting public school students will be upheld
wherever specific constitutional guarantees are not invoked. The Court
has consistently denied review to public school haircut and appearance
cases even though they are frequently couched in due process terms.6"
Similarly, it appears unlikely that the Goss decision will have an immediate
5Id. 56 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); see also note 13 supra.
57 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
58 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 744 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 746. 60 ld. at 747.
61In Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1003 (1975) (an action for damages arising
out of the expulsion of students who "spiked" punch at a school function in violation
of a school regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating beverages), which was
decided after Goss was handed down, the Court held that a school board member
enjoys a qualified immunity from liability for damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless
he knew or should have known that his official disciplinary actions would violate the
constitutional rights of the student, or acted with malicious intent. The majority
(White, J.) took the opportunity to reaffirm the traditional due process approach:
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school adminis-
trators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.
Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at
school [citing Tinker, Barnette and Goss]. But § 1983 does not extend the right
to reitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary
proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of
public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necesarily [sic] upon the
discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members,
and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of
errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of
violations of specific constitutional guarantees [citing Epperson and Tinker].
62 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 508 (1969)
(specifically exempting any relation which that case might have to the "regulation of
the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment ... "); Olff
v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970);
Spring, 1975]
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impact on the success of those cases which challenge corporal punishment'
or searches and seizures" in the public schools. The Goss decision,
however, is evidence that the Supreme Court is willing to extend
constitutional protection to public school students in a proper case.
In perspective, Goss furthers the continuing erosion of the
proposition that the constitutional rights of children are not co-extensive
with those of adults.65 The concept that a public school student has
interests which in a proper case may call forth the protection of the
due process clause may promote the application and expansion of
additional constitutional rights for minors. However, in continuing an
assessment of the constitutional rights due to public school students, the
courts appear destined to decide on a case by case basis.
While the Goss decision is not a "cure-all" for unjust and arbitrary
suspensions of students from the public schools, it is to be expected that
the requirements of procedural due process will at least curtail summary
suspensions. Furthermore, the implication is that neither the Ohio school
boards, nor the school boards in states similarly affected by the Goss
decision, will be forced to seriously alter their administrative procedures
in order to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate. The Court itself
states, "we have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to
avoid unfair suspensions."'6 6 Despite the minimal requirements involved in
according due process, problems remain. Recent events indicate that
disciplinary suspensions have been meted out for reasons which may
appear upon their face to be arbitrary and unreasonable. These include
suspensions based solely on race, under the guise of suspensions for
truancy, 67 and the increasing extent of reliance upon the right to suspend.
68
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970);
Ferrel v. Dallas Indep. School Dist, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
856 (1968).
63 See generally Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd per curiam,
458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Comment, Corporal
Punishment in the Public Schools: The Legal Questions, 7 AKRON L. REV. 457 (1974).
64 See generally Frels, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools, 11 HousTON L. REv.
876 (1974); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739 (1974).
65 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
66 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975).
67 See Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1975, at C-1, which reported that the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund has filed suit alleging that disproportionate suspension
figures in Prince George's County Schools present a pattern of racial discrimination
in discipline. The news article states in pertinent part:
In past years, about one-third of those students suspended were suspended for
truancy.... At Benjamin Tasker Jr. High, for example, where 65.9 percent of
the students suspended in 1972-73 were blacks, 71 per cent of the students
suspended last year [1973-74] were blacks. Blacks make up 14 percent of the
school's population.
68See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 745 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (which makes
reference to various suspension statistics contained in amicus briefs).
[V/ol. 8:3
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Now that they are under the scrutiny of the courts for the purposes of
guaranteeing procedural due process, public schools presumably will be
more cautious to avoid arbitrary and unreasonable deprivations of
educational benefits. It is foreseeable however, that many more student
rights cases will be brought into the courts on due process grounds.
Curiously, the Court places greater emphasis on a student's property
interest in educational benefits than on a student's liberty interest in his or
her reputation as calling forth the protection of the due process clause.
The Court's rationale appears to be based on the idea that although a
property interest in educational benefits is inherent wherever a state has
enacted a compulsory education statute, a liberty interest in reputation
may not be as clearly evidenced. In contrast to the property interest, the
liberty interest in reputation is abstractly defined.6 9 Additionally, in any
particular case the liberty interest in reputation may be safeguarded by
the fact that the suspension resulting from charges of misconduct is not
recorded, or that legislative enactments allow the parent or student to
challenge the contents of such school files.70 However, if the liberty interest
in reputation is to be as broadly construed as the Court appears more
inclined to view it, an unconstitutional denial of an educational benefit
which other students enjoy may be found. Wherever a student is deprived
of an education for any period of time on charges of misconduct without
procedural due process, when the charges could seriously damage the
student's standing with fellow students and his teachers, an unconstitutional
denial under the liberty interest may be in evidence.7
The Goss decision fails to answer the question whether a public
school student is entitled to due process prior to suspension, or as soon as
is practicable thereafter, in the absence of a state compulsory education
statute. The obvious answer under the Court's rationale appears to be that
there can be no property interest in educational benefits without a state
compulsory education statute and that a right under the due process clause
to notice and a hearing could not be invoked. The question is not without
merit. For example, Mississippi has neither constitutional nor statutory
mandatory provisions for public education. 72 It is arguable that in a case
similar to Goss arising in such a state a liberty interest in reputation alone
69 See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)
("In a constitution for a free people there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty'
must be broad indeed.").
7OE.g., Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 513, 88 Stat. 484 (Aug.
21, 1974) (parents and students are allowed access to certain public records under
specific circumstances and may challenge the content of such records before they are
released to employers or other schools).
71 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975).
72 Mississippi's statutory provisions which mandated public education were encom-
passed within Miss. CoDE ANN. § 6509, 6510, 6512-6517 (1942), but were repealed
by ch. 288 of the 1956 session laws,
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may be enough to invoke the minimal due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment before a student may be suspended from a
public school on charges of misconduct.
Having expanded the Roth rationale to its logical limits, the Supreme
Court in Goss lends further authority to the proposition that governmental
infringement of any property interest granted by state law which is not
de minimus may, in a proper case, come under the protection of the due
process clause.73 However, the primary impact of the Goss decision is that
the courts are now in agreement that education is a property interest
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
a person cannot be arbitrarily deprived of an education, wherever the
right to that education is secured by a state compulsory attendance statute.
The Supreme Court appears to have gone as far as it can without
overruling Rodriquez74 and declaring education to be a fundamental right
protected by the United States Constitution.
GLENN W. SODEN
WRONGFUL DEATH: FETAL RIGHTS-CAUSE
OF ACTION GRANTED FOR FETAL DEATHS
UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974)
A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION, Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,' was decided
as a result of an automobile accident that occurred on March 2,
1974, near the small Alabama town of Gulf Shores. Although the facts
of the incident were not fully recounted, it appears that the plaintiff, who
was eight and one-half months pregnant at the time,2 was struck by a
negligently operated city police car and severely injured. Although plaintiff
recovered from her injuries, the child did not and was stillborn. 3 Mrs. Eich
then sued, seeking damages for the death of the unborn child and basing
her action on an Alabama wrongful death statute, entitled "Suits for
injuries causing death of minor child."'4 That statute reads in relevant
73 E.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), at 164 (Powell, J., concurring), and
at 171 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
74411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973), and at 110-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974).
2 Id. at 355.
3 Id.
4 The defense of gove:mmental _mmunity had been waived. Id. at 355 n.1.
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